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Abstract—With the globalization of the semiconductor manu-
facturing process, electronic devices are powerless against ma-
licious modification of hardware in the supply chain. The ever-
increasing threat of hardware Trojan attacks against integrated
circuits has spurred a need for accurate and efficient detection
methods. Ring oscillator network (RON) is used to detect the
Trojan by capturing the difference in power consumption; the
power consumption of a Trojan-free circuit is different from the
Trojan-inserted circuit. However, the process variation and mea-
surement noise are the major obstacles to detect hardware Trojan
with high accuracy. In this paper, we quantitatively compare four
supervised machine learning algorithms and classifier optimiza-
tion strategies for maximizing accuracy and minimizing the false
positive rate (FPR). These supervised learning techniques show
an improved false positive rate compared to principal component
analysis (PCA) and convex hull classification by nearly 40% while
maintaining > 90% binary classification accuracy.
Index Terms—hardware Trojans, machine learning, supervised
learning, ring oscillator network
I. INTRODUCTION
While the transition from vertically integrated supply chains
to horizontally integrated has decreased costs for integrated
circuit (IC) designers; the ”fabless” approach comes with the
steep price of trust [1], [2], [4]–[6], [8]–[11]. Semiconductor
designers now must trust their intellectual property (IP) to
multiple parties in order to have their ICs manufactured at
foundries [8], [11]. Not only do they run the risk of having
their IP stolen, but it is not uncommon for untrusted system
integrators and foundries to insert hardware Trojans before
shipping the final product [1], [2], [4], [5]. These Trojans
are capable of leaking sensitive information, disabling key
portions of the IC, self-destructing the chip, or hindering per-
formance [1], [2]. This has driven the need for fast, accurate,
and simple methods of detecting infected ICs before they are
able to taint the supply chain.
With this rising need, some research in the field of hardware
security has been focused on finding optimal methods of
detecting and classifying Trojans. Initial research suggested
the use of semi-invasive strategies such as scanning electron
microscopy (SEM) for failure analysis. However, this is expen-
sive and time consuming for it to be applied to every IC. Using
netlist failure detection techniques was also unsuccessful due
to Trojans that add functional logic remaining undetected.
The most promising technique relies on the use of side
channel information as it is non-invasive and can be done
quickly. By monitoring side channel information from an
IC power grid it is possible to detect Trojans due to their
additional activity [15]. In [13], the authors developed a ring
oscillator network (RON) in a chip’s power grid for hardware
Trojan detection. The increased switching activity from Trojan
activation will manifest itself in decreased RO frequencies
due to the variable voltage drop in the chip’s power network.
Using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and convex hull
classification ( [19], [20]) they were able to achieve greater
than 80% classification accuracy with a false positive rate of
50%.
This was improved upon in [16] using a genetic algorithm
(GA) for feature reduction and a support vector machine
(SVM) for classification. Feature reduction allows machine
learning algorithms to reduce the feature space and decrease
training time and the possibility of over fitting. The genetic
algorithm is built upon the idea of natural selection where the
best features will ”survive” through each generation. When
the end of the algorithm is reached you will be left with the
optimal feature set. This in addition to the use of SVM resulted
in 99.6% classification accuracy and a reduced false positive
rate. However, [16] still suffers from a large FPR.
In this paper, we present a supervised machine learning
approach for the classification of Trojan free and infected
ICs using a RON. The results show that we maintain similar
accuracy to previous work in addition to reducing the FPR
by using the K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Support Vector
Machine (SVM), Naive Bayes, and ensemble classification
algorithms [23]–[26]. Experimental results show detection
accuracy > 88% with some classifiers even reaching 97.4%.
Low false positive rates (FPR) were also achieved and in the
case of two classifiers a ∼ 0% FPR was reached.
The rest of this paper will be laid out as follows: Section II
will provide all necessary background information, Section III
will discuss my proposed method of classification, and Section
IV will contain the results and discussion of our proposed
method. Section V will conclude our proposed work.
II. BACKGROUND AND EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
A. Hardware Trojan and Related Work
Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications made by
attackers during the design and manufacturing process [1], [2],
[5], [6]. Trojans can be used to degrade performance, steal
information, or block functionality of an IC [1], [2]. These
unwanted circuit additions are often hard to detect because
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they are not always triggered or activated by standard test
procedures [1], [2]. Trojans also come in a wide variety of
formats so no single filter can catch them all. These Trojans
are unwanted and pose a risk to the chip owners of receiving
secretly modified hardware that could lead to devastating
consequences [1], [2]. A hardware Trojan can be classified into
three main categories according to their physical, activation,
and action characteristics [1], [2]. The physical characteristics
category describes the various hardware manifestations of
Trojans according to their shape and size; the activation char-
acteristics describe the conditions, which activate the Trojans,
and action characteristics refer to the behavior of the Trojans
[1], [2].
Current Trojan detection methods largely focus on (i) func-
tional testing and (ii) side channel analysis [6], [7], [13]–[16].
Functional verification is the attempt to activate Trojans by
applying test vectors and comparing the responses with the
correct results [1], [15]. The difficulty with this approach is
the rarity of which some hardware Trojans are activated. It is
nearly impossible to explore every possible state of a circuit
and search for Trojan activity [6]. Whereas, side-channel anal-
yses detect the HT by analyzing the physical characteristics
of the IC chip such as transient current, leakage current,
delay, energy, heat generation, or EM radiation [6], [7], [12]–
[15]. In both approaches, the outputs of circuit under test
are compared with the outputs of a golden circuit. Typically,
the adversary would design a Trojan to evade detection by
ensuring rare activation to evade logic testing and minimal
physical characteristics, like size, to escape side channel
based testing. Backside optical imaging of the fabricated chip
enables extraction of the full standard cell layout of the chip
with the watermarks, which in turn can be validated with
image processing against the expected simulated layout to
detect any changes made to accommodate hardware Trojans
[12]. A challenge in backside imaging is obtaining a high
enough spatial resolution for an accurate representation of a
nanometer-scale circuit [12].
B. Supervised Learning
In the field of machine learning there are two main ap-
proaches in use: supervised and unsupervised learning [22].
Unsupervised learning is outside the scope of this paper and
will not be discussed further for the sake of brevity. Supervised
learning algorithms work under the assumption the training
data is labeled before being processed by the algorithm.
By labeling the data, the algorithm then knows the desired
output for the given input set and can create a hypothesis for
determining the desired output for future inputs [22]. Within
the topic of supervised learning exist two problem types:
regression and classification. Regression algorithms are going
to map input values to a real output value, e.g., predicting
stock market prices given a feature set. On the other hand,
classification algorithms will place a set of input data points
into one or more ”classes”, e.g. Trojan free or Trojan infected.
In this paper, a binary classification ( [21], [22]) approach
is used to classify each IC as either Trojan free or Trojan
infected. In order to properly train the classifier we must
operate under the assumption we have data from both Trojan
free and Trojan infected circuits. Obtaining known Trojan free
ICs is a challenge in and of itself, but knowing which ICs
are infected with Trojans will require some other method of
detection until enough data can be collected to train a classifier.
C. K-Nearest Neighbors
One of the simplest and yet most popular machine learning
algorithms is k-nearest neighbors (KNN). When used for
classification the k nearest training samples in the feature
space are used to classify the new point through a simple
majority vote. This simplicity does come with the cost of
longer classification times for larger data sets. The value k is
usually defined as a positive integer, and in the case of binary
classification it is useful to set k as an odd number to prevent
a split decision. The distance metric can be any method of
calculating distance, but Euclidean distance is often used. It
can be defined as follows:
d(x, y) =
√
(x1 − y1)2 + · · ·+ (xn − yn)2 (1)
As can be seen in 1, the value of k will have an effect on
the classifiers performance. By comparing the mean error and
accuracy values for a series of k values it is possible to find
the most optimal k value for a data set.
Fig. 1. An example of the KNN algorithm showing the effect the value of k
has on classification. Notice that the new example will be classified as class
1 if k = 1, but class 2 if k = 3 [17].
In this paper, the classifier was trained using a range of
k values from 1 to 40 and the value with the best FPR and
accuracy was selected without being over fitted. It is usually
safe to select a value of k near the square root of the number
of training samples. However, low values of k will lead to a
classifier that performs worse with noisy data, and high values
of k can lead to over fitting the classifier to the training data.
D. Support Vector Machine
Another popular machine learning algorithm is known as
the support vector machine (SVM) [24]. While not as simple
as KNN it is much more powerful for classification and
regression applications. The training of the SVM consists of
finding the optimal hyperplane that will linearly classify data
points with the largest margin possible between the two classes
of data points. However, not all data can be linearly separated
by a hyperplane in which case we must apply a ”kernel trick”
to transform the feature space.
If we define our training data as a set of points in the form
of ( ~x1, y1), . . . , ( ~xn, yn), where ~xi is a vector and yi is -1 or 1
to represent the class of ~xi, then we can define our hyperplane
as satisfying the following equation [24]:
~w · ~x− b = 0 (2)
If the data set is linearly separable then one class can be
defined as anything on or above the boundary ~w · ~x − b = 1
and the other class can be defined as anything on or below
~w · ~x − b = −1. Now in order to train the SVM we want
to minimize the difference between these two hyperplanes so
that the margin between the two classes is maximized. Thus
the problem simplifies down into:
min
n1...ni
for yi(~w · ~xi − b) ≥ 1 (3)
The classifier will then be defined by ~w and b. An example of
a hyperplane used to separate two classes of data can be seen
in 2.
Fig. 2. Example of a SVM hyperplane separating two classes of data. In this
example A, B, and C would be classified by computing the dot product. They
all wold be classified as class ’x’ [18]
This method will only work for linearly separable data and
the classification of other data requires the replacement of the
dot product with a nonlinear kernel function, thus the name
”kernel trick”. By using the kernel function we can now put a
hyperplane in our higher dimensional nonlinear feature space.
In this paper a Gaussian radial base function was used.
k( ~wi, ~xj) = exp(−γ‖~xi − ~xj‖2) for γ > 0 (4)
E. Naive Bayes
The construction of classifiers using Naive Bayes is a
relatively simple process that can produce highly accurate and
fast classification results using a probabilistic approach [25].
Using Bayes theorem we can generate the probability that a
data point will belong to a class Ck given the presence of one
of the features of the data [25].
P (Ck|x) = P (x|Ck)P (Ck)
P (x)
(5)
However, when trying to build a classifier we are interested
in the probability a data point belongs in class given multiple
features. Using the chain rule Bayes theorem can be expanded
to account for this. Assuming the n features in the data set can
be represented as X = (x1, x2, ..., xn) then it follows [25]:
P (Ck|x1, ..., xn) = P (x1|Ck)P (x2|Ck)...P (xn|Ck)P (Ck)
P (x1)P (x2)...P (xn)
(6)
Now if we assume the conditional independence of the
features in the set:
P (Ck|x1, ..., xn) = P (C = Ck)
∏
i P (xi|C = Ck)∑
j P (C = Cj)
∏
i P (Xi|C = Cj
(7)
Finally, to create a classification rule we must have a way
of making decisions. Using a maximum a posteriori rule, or
simply stated choosing the most probable outcome, we can
decide how to assign class labels to data points.
y = argmaxP (Ck)
n∏
i=1
P (xi|Ck) (8)
Naive Bayes can be applied in one of three ways to estimate
the likelihood of the features. A Gaussian classifier will
assume the features are distributed on a Gaussian distribution,
Multinomial will assume multinomially distributed data, and
Bernoulli will assume binary-valued features. The Gaussian
classifier was selected in this paper due to the continuous
nature of the data set.
F. Ensemble Learning
Ensemble learning is another technique for producing better
prediction results using machine learning algorithms [26]. It
operates under the assumption that by combining the predictive
power of single algorithms it is possible to increase the overall
possible predictive power. Several popular strategies include
voting, bagging, stacking, boosting, and ”bucket of models”.
In this paper, we will only be implementing a simple voting
method. This is done by taking the output of each of the three
classifiers and using it as a vote. The class with the most votes
will then be the output of the classifier. Theoretically, given an
odd number of classifiers in the ensemble a decision should
be made every time that represents the best of each classifier
[26]. However, if the ensemble is made up of an even number
of classifiers situations can arise resulting in split decisions.
This is said to be an unstable decision. This can be mitigated
through the use of either an odd number of classifiers or using
weighted voting to reduce the possibility of a split decision.
G. Ring Oscillator Network and Trojan Detection
Recent work has shown that a ring oscillator (RO) network
(RON) connected to the power supply structure of an IC can
be used to detect hardware Trojan activity. As shown in 3, ROs
consisting of inverters and a NAND gate for activation control
are placed in a vertical orientation within the power structure
of an IC. The ROs are then provided test patterns from a
linear feedback shift register and a decoder. These outputs are
then selected using a multiplexer and a counter registering
the number of oscillations from the selected RO. The RO’s
frequency can then be derived from the number of oscillations.
Any Trojan inserted into an IC will result in extra noise in the
power supply structure that would not otherwise be present in
a ”golden” chip. By injecting the same test patterns into every
IC the Trojans should at least partially active and thus cause
extra noise. Since a RO’s frequency is directly related to its
power supply voltage this Trojan caused power supply noise
should propagate to the RO’s frequency and result in differing
measurements between clean and infected ICs [13], [16].
However, the frequency differences are not always dis-
cernible to the human eye nor to simple algorithmic classi-
fication strategies due to process variations and other factors.
In [13] Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used as
a means of feature reduction. The data set contained the
frequency data from 8 ROs, but through feature reduction
could be accurately represented with just 3. A simple convex
hull classification method was then used to classify each IC
as either Trojan free or into one of the 23 Trojan categories.
While the RON is successful at detecting the difference
between Trojan free and Trojan infected circuits the false
positive rate was nearly 50%. Using the data collected from
the RON we will try to improve on this false positive rate
while maintaining above 90% classification accuracy.
Fig. 3. The ring oscillator network used for Trojan detection. While 8 ROs
are used in this configuration the structure will differ based on the power
network of the IC you are trying to protect [13], [16]
H. Experimental Set-up
We conducted our experiments on eight FPGA boards
(Nexys4 DDR development board [27]). Each FPGA board
is divided into four separate regions to increase the sample
size. Each region is considered as an individual IC and Trojan,
and the RON architecture is implemented in only a single
portion at a time in order to make sure that one portion
(or an individual IC) does not interfere another. We used a
total of eight 41-stage ROs in each portion (i.e., IC). We
distributed combinational and sequential Trojans ( [28]) in
one portion randomly. We used several Trojan benchmarks
from Trusthub [28]. We measured the average RO frequency
at room temperature and nominal operating voltage from 50
measurements (with Trojan and without Trojan) to cancel
out the measurement noise. We included ITC-99 ( [29])
benchmarks for normal operation.
III. METHOD
The method we will use in this paper is to use the four
previously discussed supervised classification approaches and
optimize them for accuracy and a low FPR. The main moti-
vation for this is to reduce potential waste of Trojan free ICs
that would otherwise be discarded due to being classified as
infected. However, accuracy must be maintained to prevent
Trojans from being introduced into the supply chain.
In order to do this, from the collected data, each chip has
readings for two ”golden” or Trojan free samples and 23
Trojan inserted samples. The data was collected using the
test setup described in II-H. This data was then be labeled
accordingly and used to train the classifiers.
The KNN classifier will then be optimized by finding the
best k value for maintaining accuracy and minimizing the
FPR. By training the KNN classifier on a range of k values
and different training sample sizes we were able to select
the best value for our data set. The SVM classifier will be
optimized using two slack values pertaining to the Gaussian
kernel function, C and γ. C can be considered the weight
correct classification has over maximizing the margin between
the two classes. Gamma is the inverse of the variance of
our Gaussian function. Thus, a small γ will lead to a large
variance and points could be similar even if they are not close
together and vice versa. In order to find the optimal γ and
C values we have used a grid search method in which a
given set of values is exhaustively run through until the best
values for the data set are found. The Naive Bayes Gaussian
classifier will not be tuned using any parameters. Each of
the three classifiers will then be combined in a simple voting
ensemble in the following combinations: KNN+SVM+Naive
Bayes, KNN+SVM, KNN+Naive Bayes, and SVM+Naive
Bayes. The KNN and SVM classifiers will retain the same
optimization parameters as they had being trained individually.
IV. RESULTS
Following the method above each classifier was trained and
optimized for three different sized data sets consisting of 6
chips, 12 chips, and 24 chips. Each sample size was then
repeated for 20 trials and the average accuracy, false positive
rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR), true negative rate (TNR),
and true positive rate (TPR) were calculated and recorded as
follows:
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
(9)
TNR =
TN
TN + FP
(10)
FNR =
FN
FN + TP
(11)
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
(12)
Fig. 4. A plot showing the effect the value of k has on the classifier accuracy.
As can be seen a k value of 2 provides enough accuracy without being over
fitted.
Fig. 5. A plot showing the effect the value of k has on the classifier false
positive rate. As shown higher values of k will lead to over fitting and higher
false positive rates.
The optimization step of the training led to the discovery
of useful properties of our data set. Initial estimates for the
value of k when training the KNN classifier used the square
root of the number of samples in the training data set. While
this resulted in a very accurate classifier it came at the cost
of a FPR greater than or equal to 50%. This is most likely
a result of the data set having little noise and being very
prone to over fitting. In Figure 4, the accuracy for a range
of k values is depicted, note that as the value increases the
accuracy tends to plateau as a result of over-fitting. Figure
5 shows the same plateau for the FPR. Since we want to
avoid over-fitting and lower k values perform well we can
assume the data set is not noisy. This led to the decision to
use a k value of 2 for every sample size. This maintained the
greater than 90% accuracy benchmark and had a best case
FPR of only 9.4%, a near 40% decrease compared to PCA
and convex hull classification. Even with small training sets
the KNN maintained a FPR under 20% (Table I).
TABLE I
KNN CLASSIFIER RESULTS
Metric Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR 0.813 0.815 0.906
FPR 0.187 0.185 0.094
FNR 0.075 0.063 0.051
TPR 0.916 0.927 0.745
Accuracy 0.916 0.927 0.945
Optimizing the SVM proved to be more difficult than the
KNN classifier. The grid search was quick to converge on
a C value of 1 and γ value of 0.1, but the FPR left much
to be desired. As can be seen in Table II, the SVM is very
accurate but when trained on fewer samples it struggles with
a high FPR. Using a balancing optimization it was still able
to achieve a 97.4% classification accuracy and a 7.1% FPR
(Table II) and outperform convex hull and approach the results
achieved in [16]. This leads me to believe that with a larger
data set and increased training set sizes the SVM could become
more accurate and reduce the FPR even further. Unfortunately,
it is not always possible to have large data sets due to factors
outlined above.
TABLE II
SVM CLASSIFIER RESULTS
Metric Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR 0.445 0.605 0.929
FPR 0.555 0.355 0.071
FNR 0.017 0.023 0.023
TPR 0.983 0.977 0.977
Accuracy 0.940 0.946 0.974
Despite the many operating assumptions the Naive Bayes
classifier is a very powerful but simple and fast method.
With no optimization the classifier produced results that were
slightly less accurate compared to the other classifiers. At the 6
chip sample size the classifier was 88.3% accurate but had only
a 6.9% FPR. The accuracy only dropped 0.1% when increasing
the training sample size to 12 chips, but the FPR dropped to
6.1%, the lowest FPR of any non-ensemble classifier (Table
III). The Naive Bayes classifier produced the best results in
term of FPR but was held back by a higher FNR which led to
reduced accuracy. In theory, this could be reduced by tuning
the decision threshold, but would most likely result in the FPR
increasing.
When using ensemble learning the hope is the results are
better than that of each of the individual classifiers by them-
selves. However, it also runs the risk of the opposite occurring.
TABLE III
NAIVE BAYES GAUSSIAN CLASSIFIER RESULTS
Metric Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR 0.931 0.955 0.939
FPR 0.069 0.045 0.061
FNR 0.121 0.124 0.127
TPR 0.879 0.876 0.873
Accuracy 0.883 0.882 0.873
We encountered both situations while training the ensembles.
The ensemble containing all three classifiers performed better
than the lone SVM classifier at the lower training sample
sizes. Yet, it was outperformed at the 24 chip sample size
(Table IV). The Naive Bayes and KNN/SVM ensembles had
the lowest overall FPRs of all classifiers, but struggled to
beat the desired 90% binary classification accuracy threshold
(Tables VI & VII). This can be attributed to the Naive
Bayes classifier’s characteristics dominating those of the other
classifiers. Despite the lower accuracy, at the 24 chip training
sample size both ensembles had a 0% FPR. Overall, the best
ensemble method was the combination of the SVM and KNN
classifiers (Table V). At the lower training sample sizes the
FPR was only 19.6% and 16.4%, but kept an accuracy of
92.1% and 93.0% respectively. At the 24 chip training sample
size the FPR was 0.03% higher than the SVM alone but with
a 3.4% accuracy loss.
TABLE IV
SVM+KNN+NB ENSEMBLE CLASSIFIER RESULTS
Metric Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR 0.785 0.796 0.908
FPR 0.215 0.204 0.092
FNR 0.066 0.062 0.055
TPR 0.934 0.938 0.945
Accuracy 0.922 0.927 0.943
TABLE V
SVM+KNN ENSEMBLE CLASSIFIER RESULTS
Metric Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR 0.804 0.836 0.926
FPR 0.196 0.164 0.074
FNR 0.069 0.062 0.058
TPR 0.931 0.938 0.942
Accuracy 0.921 0.930 0.940
Considering the results, the choice for the best approach
is very dependent on the data set and desired outcomes. The
Naive Bayes and KNN classifiers are extremely fast, simple,
and do well at maintaining low FPRs and moderate accuracy
throughout the sample sizes. Combining the SVM and KNN
classifiers in an ensemble allowed the classifier to maintain
greater than 90% accuracy, but kept the FPR lower compared
to using a SVM alone. Thus, with very little data the best
TABLE VI
SVM+NB ENSEMBLE CLASSIFIER RESULTS
Metric Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR 0.939 0.953 1.000
FPR 0.061 0.047 0.000
FNR 0.125 0.127 0.129
TPR 0.875 0.873 0.871
Accuracy 0.880 0.879 0.881
TABLE VII
KNN+NB ENSEMBLE CLASSIFIER RESULTS
Metric Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR 0.982 0.993 1.000
FPR 0.018 0.007 0.000
FNR 0.122 0.126 0.137
TPR 0.878 0.874 0.863
Accuracy 0.886 0.883 0.873
classification performance will come from a Naive Bayes or
ensemble containing the Naive Bayes classifier such as the
KNN and NB ensemble. However, with sufficient data the
SVM classifier alone still provides the best trade off between
accuracy and FPR.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a quantitative comparison of
four supervised machine learning algorithms’ performance
when classifying ICs based on their ring oscillator network
frequencies. This method was able to achieve 97.6% binary
classification accuracy and a FPR of just 7.1% when using
a SVM classifier, and ensemble approaches achieved ∼88%
accuracy with no false positives. Despite these promising
results, supervised learning approaches are often impractical
in a real supply chain. Finding proven ’Golden chips’ is a
challenge and knowing which chips are infected at the scaled
assumed in the data set is near impossible. Future work is
planned to use unsupervised approaches and only ”Golden”
chip data to classify ICs as Trojan free or infected to maximize
utility in real supply chains.
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